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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE
STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD DIAMOND & PEGGY DIAMOND,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
ROBERT E. CHRISTOFFERSON, RUTH R.
CHRISTOFFERSON,husband and wife,
and GLEN R. CHRISTOFFERSON, LAURA
CHRISTOFFERSON, husband and wife,
and the UNKNOWN WIVES, DEVICES,
HEIRS AND CREDITORS OF THE ABOVENAMED PARTIES AND ALL OTHER
UNKNOWN PERSONS WHO HAVE OR
CLAIM TO HAVE ANY RIGHT, TITLE
OR ESTATE, LIEN OR INTEREST IN THE
PROPERTY DESCRIBED HEREIN,

Case NO. 16642

Defendants and Respondents.
PETITION OF APPELLANTS FOR RE-HEARING
RELIEF SOUGHT ON RE-HEARING
The appellants request that the Supreme Court decision
filed on October 21, 1980, be vacated and that the Court
reverse the findings of the district court and remand this
matter back for trial and/or enter an order in favor of the
appellants against the respondents.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court entered a decision on October 21,
1980, adverse to the appellants.

The appellants now·seek

to have a re-hearing of that decision because: 1) the
Supreme Court overlooked one of the major issues raised by
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the appellants on appeal.

The appellants contended that

the trial court committed error when it ruled that the
quantum of proof to establish a right-of-way was by a preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence.
this issue.

2)

The Supreme Court did not deal with
The Supreme Court, in ruling on the issue

of whether or not the right-of-way had been abandoned,
made a mistake as to the facts which were established at
the time of the trial hearing.

In addition, the Court

required the appellants to show specific intent to establish
abandonment of the right-of-way but did not require the
same standard of proof of the respondents in establishing
the right-of-way.
A R G U M E N T

POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER OR RULE ON THE ISSUE
THAT THE DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HAD APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD
OF PROOF REQUIRING ONLY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE
INSTEAD OF CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
At the trial in the lower court, the appellants conceded that a right-of-way existed that was approximately
twenty-one (21) feet wide.

This was based upon the fact

that a survey had been conducted approximately twenty (20)
years earlier that indicated the lane was nineteen (19)
feet wide on one end and approximately twenty-one (21) feet
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wide on the opposite end.

The appellants did not at any

time agree that the right-of-way had ever been thirtythree (33) feet wide.

The burden was upon the respondents

to prove by clear and convincing evidence any width they
claimed in excess of twenty-one (21) feet.

Judge Gould,

in his Memorandum Decision, stated that the respondents
were only required to demonstrate

,~.a

preponderance of

the evidence that their easement was thirty-three (33)
feet wide.

The Judge went on to state in part as follows:

A true application of the rule of preponderance evidence in a civil case is a
simple proposition is the fact alleged
more probably true than not true • • •
This court, on numerous cases, has indicated that the
burden that must be born by a person claiming a right-ofway is that of proof by clear and convincing evidence.

In

fact, the Supreme Court, in the decision issued on October 21,
1980, applied that burden to the appellants when it ruled
that the appellants had to meet that burden in order to
demonstrate the right-of-way had been abandoned.

It is

inconceivable to believe that this court could allow the
respondents to establish their case on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence but require that the appellants
meet the burden of clear and convincing evidence.
This Court, in Peterson vs. Combe, 20 U.2d 376,
438 P.2d 545 (1968), held that a party claiming that a road
was public had to bear the burden of proving by clear and
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convincing evidence that constitutionally must be justified,
The Court went on to state that a mere preponderance of
the evidence was not sufficient to show clear and convincing
evidence.

This court has ruled in a similar manner in the

cases of Buckley vs. Cox, 247 P.2d 277, 122 Utah 151, and
in Western Gateway Storage Company vs. Treseder, 56 7 P. 2d 181
(1977).

A similar decision was reached in the case of

Harmon vs. Rasmussen, 12 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962).
This case was cited by the Supreme Court in its decision of
October 21, 1980, in footnote No. 3, as supporting the fact
that clear and convincing evidence was the quantum of proof
that was required in this type of case.
As the record presently stands before this court, the
district court judge determined that the right-of-way which
is at issue was not proven by clear and convincing evidence
but merely by a preponderance of the evidence.

Since the

quantum of proof required by this court was not met in the
lower court, the court's decision must be reversed or the
matter must be referred to the trial court for a re-trial
to determine whether or not the respondents are able to
present evidence which meets the quantum of proof of
clear and convincing evidence.
POINT II
THIS COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS AND
APPLICATION OF

T~E

LAW AS IT APPLIES TO ITS OCTOBER 21,

1980 DECISION.
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The decision reached by this court on October 21,
1980, stated in two places that during the last twenty
(20) years the appellants had constructed fences and
taken other actions which narrowed the roadway.
not supported by the evidence.

This is

The evidence presented at

the trial court demonstrated that a survey was taken by a
qualified engineer in 1957, twenty-two (22) years before the
difficulties arose between the appellants and the respondents.
That survey demonstrated that the lane was nineteen (19)
feet wide on the east and twenty-one and one-half (21-1/2)
feet wide on the west.
lines 20 through 23)

(R.132, lines 7 through 19, R.134,
The appellants introduced into evidence

aerial photographs marked as Exhibits "A" and "B" which
demonstrate that in 1958, twenty-one (21) years before the
difficulties arose between the appellants and repondents,
trees were in location on both sides of the lane which
restricted the width of the lane from twenty (20) to
twenty-two (22) feet.
line 6)

(R.136, line

20 through R.137,

The engineer who made the survey testified that

he has been familiar with the lane since he made the original
survey in 1957 and that the width of the fences has not
changed during that twenty-two (22) year period.

(R.135,

lines 16 through 18, R.145, lines 8 through 11)

There was

no evidence produced at the trial court which demonstrated
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that the appellants or anyone owning the property prior
to them had moved fenceposts or any other structures within the twenty-one (21) to twenty-two (22) foot width that
was established in 1957.

However, this court made such a

determination in paragraphs 2, 8 and 9 of its decision.
Consequently, the facts upon which this court based its
October 21, 1980, decision were inaccurate and without
foundation in the trial court records.
It is the contention of the appellants that the quantum
of proof for an abandonment of a right-of-way should not be
any greater than the proof required for the establishment
of a right-of-way.

The intent necessary to establish

the right-of-way is generally demonstrated by the fact that
a person uses a right-of-way without specific objections on
the part of the person owning the fee for a period of twenty
(20) years.

Consequently, it is the appellants' contention

that the abandonment of a right-of-way, likewise, can be
demonstrated by the fact that a right-of-way is restricted
without any objection being made to that restriction for a
twenty-year (20) period of time.

To hold otherwise would be

manifestly unfair to all parties involved.
This court, in Richard vs. Pine View Ranch, Inc.,
559 P.2d 948 (1977), stated that "if a twenty year adverse
use was established, then that could only be defeated by a
prohibition of use for a like period".

The Utah Supreme
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Court has also held that when parties have slept upon
their rights they will not be heard to complain after a
period of twenty (20) years.

In a boundary dispute issue

in the case of King vs. Fronk, 15 Utah 2d 135, 378 P.2d 1893
(1963) this court held that where a boundary is allowed to
exist for a long period of time without protest there is
established an implied agreement based upon the passage of
time.

These cases clearly indicate that intent is mani-

fested by a failure to act over a passage of time.
decisions have been reached in other states.

Similar

A California

Appellate Court, in Hansen vs. Daniel, 289 P.2d 50 (Cal. App.),
stated that an easement may be extinguished by non-use and
abandonment.by a use adverse to the easement for a period
equalling the time required to establish the easement. A
Nevada court, in the case of Brooks vs. Jensen, 483 P.2d 650,
held that an easement can be abandoned and that non-use of
the easement is evidence of such intent.

Clearly in this

case, the respondents failed to object to the approximately
twenty-one (21) foot width for a period of approximately
twenty-two (22) years.

No greater proof of intent was

required of the respondents or produced by them in
attempting to establish an original easement of thirty-three
(33)

feet.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court applied the wrong quantum of proof
when in ruled that the respondents only had to demonstrate
existence of a thirty-three (33) foot right-of-way by a
preponderance of the evidence rather than by clear and convincing evidence.

The Supreme Court incorrectly assumed

that the appellants had narrowed the right-of-way since the
survey was conducted in 1957.

In fact, the right-of-way

was not narrowed during this period of time but was used
actively at the twenty-one (21) foot width for a period
of twenty-two (22) years.

This court's decision seemed to

state that a right-of-way can be created merely from the
use for a period of twenty (20) years without showing
specific intent.

However, an abandonment of a right-of-

way can only be demonstrated by showing specific intent
to abandon.

The appellants request that this court have

a re-hearing in this matter and an order reversing the lower
court's decision in favor of the appellants or remand this
matter back for trial to the district court.
DATED this 6th day of November, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT A. · ECHARD
Attorney for PlaintiffsAppellants

I
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